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We study the pricing and capacity allocation problem of a service provider who serves two distinct customer
classes. Customers within each class are inherently heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for service,
but their utilities are also aected by the presence of other customers in the system. Specically, customer
utilities depend on how many customers are in the system at the time of service as well as who these other
customers are. We nd that if the service provider can price discriminate between customer classes, pricing
out a class, i.e., operating an exclusive system, can sometimes be optimal and that depends only on classes'
perceptions of each other. If the provider must charge a single price, an exclusive system is even more likely.
We extend our analysis to a service provider who can prevent class interaction by allocating separate capacity
segments to the two customer classes. Under price discrimination, allocating capacity is optimal if the \net
appreciation" between classes, as dened in the paper, is negative. However, under a single{price policy,
allocating capacity can be optimal even if this net appreciation is positive. We describe in detail how the
nature of asymmetry in classes' perception of each other determines the optimal strategy.
Key words : customer mix, crowding, pricing, capacity allocation
1. Introduction
In many service systems, service is simultaneously delivered to many customers who share the
same physical environment. For example, members of a gym workout in the same space and share
the equipment, passengers on a cruise ship share the common areas on the ship, and customers of
a nightclub enjoy the danceoor together. In such facilities, an individual customer's perception
of the service quality is highly inuenced by the composition of the clientele. For example, some
female gym members do not enjoy sharing the same facility with males, and in nightclubs and
bars, males typically have strong preferences for other customers being female (Skinner et al. 2005,
Kubacki et al. 2007). Other service settings where customer satisfaction is inuenced by the others'
characteristics (such as age, socioeconomic status, intellectual capabilities, etc.) include social clubs,
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health clubs, schools (Buchanan 1965, Basu 1989, Sandler and Tschirhart 1997), beauty salons
(Moore et al. 2005), recreational parks, adventure sports (Thakor et al. 2008), restaurants (Huang
2008), and professional conferences (Gruen et al. 2007).
Demand management for such service establishments, where each customer's satisfaction depends
on who the fellow customers are, can be particularly challenging. The service provider who is facing
this challenge has two powerful tools: pricing and capacity allocation, which, in its more extreme
form, might even mean choosing to serve only certain segments of the population. Restricting access
to certain customer segments may seem like a radical solution, but in practice it is more prevalent
than expected. Such restriction could be direct or a result of a \forced" self-selection. Gyms and
health clubs employ direct restriction when they choose to become women{only establishments or
allocate certain times of the week for the exclusive use of families with kids. On the other hand, some
rms design the service experience so as to appeal to a particular segment and let the customers
self{select. This is the idea behind theme cruises and nightclubs catering to dierent types of
clientele on dierent oors of the venue or at dierent nights of the week by carefully choosing the
music and decoration. If such capacity allocation or restriction options are not available, or as a
complementary tool, rms also use pricing as a means to manage their capacity and composition of
their clientele, and maximize their prots. For example, nightclubs use various pricing promotions
(e.g., \ladies' nights") to attract the \right" mix of customers.
Such practices are prevalent but that does not mean that they are devoid of controversy. \Ladies'
nights" have long been criticized by some as being discriminatory against men and this led to a
number of lawsuits being led over the years (Rank 2011). Recently some gyms have been the
center of attention due to similar policies. In 2007, a complaint against the Las Vegas Athletic Club
(Friess (2007), Friess (2008)) led Nevada to pass a law in 2011 making gender-based pricing legal
when used for promotional purposes (Schoenmann 2011). A more recent controversy was caused
by Fitness USA, which abruptly decided to make two of its locations in Michigan women-only. The
company preferred to oer its services exclusively to females and charge them a higher price, even
if that meant angering several, male and female, customers (Komer 2013). In general, even though
women-only health clubs have occasionally drawn ire, and some argue about their legality, they
are popular and common in and outside the U.S. It is also important to note that the revenues
associated with the leisure industry, where customer mix eects are prominent, are quite high. In
the UK, it generates over $200bn of revenue every year, provides 2.6m jobs and represents 9% of
the workforce (Wyman 2012). Similarly, in the US, the health club industry has annual revenues of
$27bn (IBISWorld 2014b) and the nightlife industry of $24bn (IBISWorld 2014a). All these gures
point to the importance of investigating the optimal pricing and capacity allocation strategies in
these contexts.
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In the establishments described above, the two fundamental questions the service provider needs
to answer are: given the available capacity, what is the \optimal" customer mix and how should
this mix be achieved? The objective of this paper is to provide insights into these two questions,
which are inextricably linked. The optimal mix could be so that the system is an exclusive one,
where service is oered to one segment of the population or an inclusive one where customers from
dierent segments interact. Alternatively, the provider may also choose to allocate capacity for the
exclusive use of each segment. Another interesting dimension is whether or not and how rm's
pricing policy aects such decisions. Our analysis sheds light on these questions, helps identify
conditions that would lead rms to choose one strategy over the other, and explains some of the
existing practices we observe in the service industry.
The main challenge in investigating these questions is that no prior work can serve as the
foundation for our modeling eort. Despite the fact that the operations management literature is
rich in articles that deal with pricing, demand management, and capacity control in the context of
service operations, the focus is not on the service process itself. Specically, the \service" experience
in these articles is typically not inuenced by the characteristics of the others with whom they
share the service experience (or service is simply not a shared experience), whereas delays in access
to service is the important dimension of the problem. As a consequence, most papers consider
queueing-based formulations. In contrast, for the service settings we are interested in, capturing
the delivery of the service process (specically, who the other customers are and how many of them
there are)|as opposed to delays in access to service|is far more important. Thus, one of the main
contributions of this paper is the development of a novel stylized formulation that permits detailed
analysis of pricing and capacity allocation decisions for such settings.
Our model assumes that the service provider serves two classes of customers. Customers of one
class have stochastically larger intrinsic valuations for the received service. Each customer knows
the distribution of service valuations for both customer classes and uses this information along
with the price to decide whether or not to purchase service. We focus rst on the pricing decision
and assume that the provider does not have the option to allocate dierent capacity segments to
dierent customer classes, but can deny service to one of the two classes altogether. We consider
two dierent settings; in x4.1, the rm has the exibility to charge dierent prices to dierent
classes, and in x4.2, the rm has to charge everyone the same price. When price discrimination is
allowed, the rm might choose to exclude a particular class from service only due to the classes'
perceptions of each other, i.e. the customer mix eects. Additionally, increasing the capacity might
increase utilization. This surprising phenomenon is observed when customers are symmetric in
their inherent willingness to pay for service and the customer mix eects are mild but disappears
as the asymmetry increases. When the rm is forced to choose a single price, a strong asymmetry
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in the feelings of the two classes about each other urges the provider to restrict access to a single
class in order to be protable. (Interestingly, this is not true when there is mutual dislike.) This
suggests that attempts to achieve price \fairness" by disallowing price discrimination might lead
the service provider to deny service to one class.
In x4.3 and x4.4 of the paper, assuming that the rm can allocate capacity to dierent customer
classes, we study the optimal allocation and pricing policy. In Section 5, we compare the dierent
strategies to shed light into the design of such a service system and we nd that if the rm can
price discriminate, whether or not the rm chooses to allocate capacity depends purely on classes'
perceptions of each other, not on any potential willingness{to{pay asymmetry between classes.
However, this choice is more complicated if the rm has to charge the same price to both classes.
In most cases, a rm that cannot price discriminate is more likely to prefer capacity allocation;
however, this is not always true if customer classes are asymmetric in their inherent willingness
to pay for service. In Section 6, we gain further insights via numerical examples and discuss the
robustness of our results through a sensitivity analysis.
2. Literature Review
Prior work in the operations management literature has mostly investigated questions related to
pricing and capacity control in service establishments where queueing prior to service is a critical
aspect of the service experience. Thus, this body of work typically considers models that capture
congestion eects and delay-sensitive customers (e.g., Naor 1969, Mendelson 1985, Mendelson and
Whang 1990, Afeche 2013, Afeche and Pavlin 2015) and/or queue lengths provide signals of
the service quality (e.g., see Debo and Veeraraghavan 2009, Veeraraghavan and Debo 2009, 2011).
This is unlike our formulation which captures the service process during delivery but not the
delays in access to service. Specically, we focus on the consumption of a service good where class
heterogeneity and the total number of customers has an impact on the customers' utility. To the
best of our knowledge, the eects of this customer-to-customer interactions and their inuence on
the rms' pricing and capacity allocation decisions, has not been analytically studied before.
One paper that is relatively closer to our work is Johari and Kumar (2010), which considers
positive-only network eects together with congestion eects. It is motivated by online services
and these two eects are formulated in a way that is more general than our approach in that the
eects not only depend on the number of active users in the system but also on the load these users
generate. However, unlike the case in our model, Johari and Kumar ignore possible asymmetry in
how customers from dierent segments feel about each other. Furthermore, their focus is completely
dierent from ours. The authors are not interested in pricing and capacity allocation decisions for
a prot{maximizing rm, but rather focus on the optimal number of users from the users' and the
manager's perspectives. The gap between the two optima is discussed along with its implications.
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In the economics literature, there are some articles related to our paper. A signicant portion of
these articles belong to a stream of work on \club theory," which originated from the seminal papers
by Tiebout (1956) and Buchanan (1965). (For an extensive review of this literature, see Cornes
and Sandler 1996 and Sandler and Tschirhart 1997.) However, this literature typically investigates
questions that are completely dierent from ours. Specically, except for a few papers (Hearne
1988, Basu 1989) that we discuss further below, the traditional club theory has not focused on
pricing and/or capacity allocation considerations of a prot{maximizing rm. Moreover, again
except for a few papers (e.g., Basu 1989, Brueckner and Lee 1989, Scotchmer 1997, Becker and
Murphy 2000), the club theory literature has typically assumed that customers are homogeneous
and their utilities do not depend on the characteristics of the other individuals in the facility.
Hearne (1988) focuses on the optimal pricing mechanisms of a monopolistic club and apart from
the focus, the paper is dierent from ours in that the customers are assumed to be homogeneous.
Basu (1989) is generally interested in contexts where recipients of a service are automatically
associated with a certain status. In the schools context, for instance, rich students are willing to pay
more than poor students and (rich or poor) students' willingness to pay depends on what fraction
of the school population is clever. This work is purely interested in whether the schools should be
allowed to charge dierent prices. Similarly, Brueckner and Lee (1989) are motivated by schools
with two groups in the population. The paper characterizes the Pareto{ecient club congurations
and carries out an equilibrium analysis for a competition model. Scotchmer (1997) denes a new
notion of approximate competitive equilibrium in a setting where the utility of each customer
type depends on the number of customers from each type. She shows that there exists such an
equilibrium when the economy is suciently large. Note that none of Basu (1989), Brueckner and
Lee (1989) and Scotchmer (1997) develop insights into the optimal pricing and capacity allocation
decisions from an individual club's perspective. The model of Chapter 5 in Becker and Murphy
(2000) is the most relevant to our work because it also assumes that the utility of a customer
depends on the ratio of customers from one class. Despite this similarity, however, they assume that
prices are determined through a competitive bidding process and there exists no service provider
who sets prices to maximize prots.
Outside the club theory literature, another stream of articles within the economics literature
deals with systems where customers experience positive network eects. Armstrong (2006) and
Rochet and Tirole (2003) study two-sided markets where the two groups of agents interact via
a, not necessarily physical, platform and the focus is on pricing mechanisms to attract the right
mix of agents from both groups and achieve a \good" balance. Since the focus is not restricted
to physical platforms, there is no consideration of capacity allocation nor crowding eects and
the main attention is driven to mechanisms to gain market share in a competitive environment.
Kostami, Kostamis and Ziya: Pricing and Capacity Allocation for Shared Services
6 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-14-165.R2
There is also some literature that refers to the \network eect" as the eect that other users in
the network have on the utility of an individual user. For example, see Oren and Smith (1981),
and more recently Candogan et al. (2012). These articles ignore the possibility that network eects
across dierent groups within the population could be dierent. To the best of our knowledge,
the only exception to this is Katz and Spiegel (1996) that uses a similar demand formulation but
with no capacity considerations. There is also a large body of work that focuses on congestion
eects leaving out positive network externalities. For examples of such work, we refer the reader
to MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995), Wang and Schulzrinne (2006), and references therein.
Finally, there are many articles in the marketing literature that investigate customer-to-customer
interactions (CCI) in services (see Nicholls 2010 for an extensive review). A number of articles
empirically study CCI in various service environments including nightclubs (Skinner et al. 2005,
Kubacki et al. 2007), professional conferences (Gruen et al. 2007), adventure sports (Thakor et al.
2008), beauty salons (Moore et al. 2005), cruise ships (Huang and Hsu 2010), and organized tours
(Wu 2007), and nd that customers can have strong preferences regarding who they share their
service experience with. Moreover, some articles discuss the importance of the management of
CCI in the service industry and point to various strategies the providers might employ. Among
these, Martin (1996) and Grove and Fisk (1997) discuss operational issues including the eective
use of capacity, which we also address in this paper. In particular, Martin (1996) investigates
customers' perceptions of and reactions to the others' behavior. He suggests improving service
experience through capacity allocation via physical separation or time allocation for the use of
dierent segments who might not enjoy the interaction. This is a practice widely used and we
also investigate it. In the same spirit, Grove and Fisk (1997) establish conditions under which the
system's capacity is fully utilized or underutilized due to the presence or behavior of others and
call for more research into identifying the optimal capacity for systems that serve many customers
simultaneously.
3. Model
We consider a service system associated with a leisure facility with capacity K > 0 and serves two
distinct customer classes, each one with the same nite size > 0. We later consider dierent class
sizes in a numerical study. Class membership of a customer is observable to the service provider and
to all the other customers. Customers enjoy the leisure facility and their utilities consist of three
dierent components. In the absence of other customers, the service value of class{1 customers is
uniformly distributed on the line segment [0;1]. Likewise, the service value of class{2 customers is
uniformly distributed on the line segment [a;1+a], a 0. Thus, on average, class{2 customers have
the same or larger inherent willingness to pay for service than class{1 customers. In the presence of
other customers, however, there are two components that may aect customer utility and depend
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on 1 and 2, the number of customers in the system belonging to class 1 and 2, respectively. To
facilitate game theoretic treatment we treat customers as non-atomic (innitesimal) and therefore,
1 and 2 as continuous parameters. Customers of a particular class might like or dislike sharing
the same service environment with the other class. Moreover, their satisfaction can be dependent
on the overall crowd size. In mathematical terms, the gross utilities U1 and U2 of a customer x in
class 1 and 2, respectively, are given by
U1(x;1; 2) = x+ b12=(1+2)+ c ((1+2)=K)) ; 0 x 1;
U2(x;2; 1) = x+ b21=(1+2)+ c ((1+2)=K)) ; a x 1+ a: (1)
The terms b12=(1+2) and b21=(1+2) in (1) captures the customer-mix eect on class{1 and
class{2 customer utilities, respectively. We assume that customers of each class are homogenous in
their perception of the customer mix and this is represented by the parameters b1 and b2. If b1 > 0
(b1 < 0), customers of class 1 prefer a customer mix with more (fewer) class{2 customers and if
b2 > 0 (b2 < 0), customers of class 2 prefer a customer mix with more (fewer) class{2 customers.
We also dene b  b1 + b2 as the \net appreciation" between the two customer classes and will
be useful in presenting our results. The reader should note that this net appreciation term has a
very specic meaning in our stylized formulation and one should be careful when interpreting the
practical implications of our results particularly in regards to how customers' perceptions of each
other aect the optimal policy decisions.
Customers' experience might also be aected by the crowding level, which is dened as (1 +
2)=K. Depending on the leisure activity, an undercrowded system or/and an overcrowded system
might not be desirable for an enjoyable experience, which in turn reduces customer utility. The
continuously dierentiable function c : [0;1]!R in (1) captures these eects on customer utilities.
We assume that c00()< 0, thereby guaranteeing a uniquely optimal crowding level for an arbitrary
customer. To avoid an empty system in equilibrium, we also assume that c(0)> 1. It is important
to note that we impose no further restrictions on c(); it can take positive or negative values, it can
be monotone or unimodal. In fact, there are some service experiences where the overall crowding
level in the system may not inuence customers' utilities, i.e. c 0, or service experiences where the
customers' utilities are aected only for certain crowding levels. In both cases, our results still hold.
However, we assume that whatever the crowding eects are, they are symmetric across classes.
We consider a game in which the leisure facility rst chooses the prices (p1; p2) simultane-
ously and commits to them. The customers arrive to the service facility, observe the price pi,
if from the class i, and decide whether to join the system or not. A customer with service
value xi has a strategy space si(xi) = 1 (customer joins the system) or si(xi) = 0 (customer
does not join the system). A Nash Equilibrium (s1(x1); s2(x2)) of this game will be such that
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s1(x1) = 1 if and only if U1(x1;
Z 1
0
s1(y)dy;
Z 1+a
a
s2(y)dy)  p1 and s2(x2) = 1 if and only if
U2(x2;
Z 1+a
a
s2(y)dy;
Z 1
0
s1(y)dy) p2 using (1).
Proposition 1. For a continuously dierentiable function c : [0;1]!R such that c00()< 0, there
exists a unique Nash Equilibrium (NE) such that a customer xi from class i will pay pi and join
the system, if xi  xi , i= 1;2 where x1; x2 satisfy
x1+ b1
a+1 x2
a+2 x1 x2
+ c

(a+2 x1 x2)
K

= p1;
x2+ b2
1 x1
a+2 x1 x2
+ c

(a+2 x1 x2)
K

= p2:
Since there is a unique mapping between the NE (x1; x

2) and (1; 2), with 1 =
Z 1
x1
s1(x1)dx1 =
(1 x1), 2 =
Z a+1
x2
s2(x2)dx2 =(a+1 x2), the NE can be equivalently expressed in terms of
(1; 2) and the equilibrium prices will be derived as follows
p1(1; 2) = 1 1=+ b12=(1+2)+ c ((1+2)=K) ; (2)
p2(2; 1) = 1+ a 2=+ b21=(1+2)+ c ((1+2)=K) : (3)
The structure of the solution is provided separately for the dierent cases in the next sections.
Because customer utilities depend on 1 and 2, which are equilibrium quantities, a potential
customer must construct beliefs about their equilibrium values when deciding to join the system.
In turn, these beliefs must be conrmed in equilibrium, that is, customers should act rationally
with respect to information and be able to correctly predict the equilibrium values, as a result. As
in all denitions of equilibrium, customers' choices and beliefs are determined simultaneously.
Before moving on to the analysis, we briey comment on the case in which classes are identical
and customer-mix eects do not exist or are ignored, i.e., a = 0 and b1 = b2 = 0. In that case, it
is easy to show that the service provider 1) always prefers to have both classes in the system to
sustain higher prices; 2) charges both classes the same price even when price discrimination is
allowed. Therefore, if classes are identical and the customer mix does not aect customer utilities,
neither capacity allocation nor price discrimination are of any value to a service provider. As
we demonstrate in this paper, asymmetry in the willingness to pay for service and/or customer-
mix eects make both price discrimination and capacity allocation eective tools to the service
providers, and explain to a great extent what is observed in practice.
To help with the exposition in the rest of the paper, we introduce the following terminology; we
call a system exclusive, if no interaction between the two classes is allowed and inclusive otherwise.
Exclusivity can be a result of restricting access to a single class or allocating capacity for the
exclusive use of each class. We call a system full if its crowding level is equal to one; we call a
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system not full if its crowding level is strictly less than one. Also, we refer to the case a = 0 as
symmetric and to the case a > 0 as asymmetric with classes described as being symmetric and
asymmetric respectively. Notice in equation (1) that the two customer classes are possibly dierent
in two dimensions: their feelings about each other and their (inherent) willingness to pay for service
and therefore, our denition of symmetry is with a slight abuse of the terminology1.
4. Optimal pricing and capacity allocation decisions
We start our analysis in x4.1 with a leisure facility where the two classes share the whole capacity
and the service provider is allowed to charge them dierently. We call this scenario price discrimi-
nation without capacity allocation (CS-DP). We continue in x4.2 with the more restrictive pricing
policy, where the provider must charge the same price to all customers and we will call this scenario
single price without capacity allocation (CS-SP). In both CS-DP and CS-SP, however, the provider
can choose to restrict access to one class only, i.e., run an exclusive system.
If the service provider is better o running an exclusive system, she might, in fact, choose
to allocate separate capacity segments for the exclusive use of each customer class. The service
provider might be able to divert customers to the \right" location depending on their class identities
or she can design the service and the service environment for dierent segments to induce customers
to self{select. In a nightclub, this usually happens by hosting theme nights on dierent days of the
week so as to appeal to customers with particular tastes. Nightclubs with adequate space might
also provide a private area for members who are willing to pay a premium so as not to socialize
with the rest of the clientele. In x4.3, we study the service provider's problem under the assumption
that she exercises her option to allocate capacity to each customer class and price discriminate
and we call this scenario price discrimination with capacity allocation (CA-DP). We then restrict
the problem to the single price case in x4.4 and we call this scenario single price with capacity
allocation (CA-SP). We use (P1), (P2), (P3), and (P4) to represent the mathematical formulations
of the optimization problems that correspond to CS-DP, CS-SP, CA-DP and CA-SP, respectively.
4.1. Price discrimination without capacity allocation
We start our analysis with a leisure facility, a nightclub for instance, where the two classes, the
male and the female customers, share the whole capacity and the service provider is allowed to
charge them dierently. In that setting, typically male customers are willing to pay more, not
for the service per se, but because they are considered to gain more from the interaction with
female customers, than female customers do (Armstrong 2006). The service provider's objective is
to charge prices so as to maximize the total prot. Hence, an individually rational provider who
can charge a dierent price to each class maximizes revenue by solving the following problem:
max1;2 R(1; 2) = 1p1(1; 2)+2p2(2; 1)
s.t. 1+2 K; 0 1 ; 0 2 : (P1)
1 Classes are truly symmetric only if a= 0 and b1 = b2.
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We rst establish some basic properties of the optimal solution (1; 

2) to problem (P1).
Lemma 1. (i) If a= 0, then 1

2 > 0 if and only if 

1 = 

2.
(ii) If a= 0, a feasible solution to (P1) at which 1 =  > 0, 2 = 0, is revenue{equivalent to a
feasible solution to (P1) at which 1 = 0, 2 = > 0.
(iii) If a> 0, then 2 >

1.
The properties described in Lemma 1 suggest that the customer mix eects play no role. Accord-
ing to the lemma, even if class-1 customers are very fond of class-2 customers but the latter despise
the former, the provider will admit the same number of customers from each class if a= 0, and will
admit more customers from class 2 if a > 0. This may seem to suggest that when it comes to the
customer mix in equilibrium, the customer-mix eects are irrelevant. However, the customer mix
eects implicitly play a role when the provider has to determine if she will operate an exclusive or
an inclusive leisure facility (1

2 > 0 or 

1

2 = 0), as we will see in Proposition 2 below. Neverthe-
less, it is true that if it is optimal for the provider to admit both classes, most customers will be
from the class that has the higher willingness to pay for service regardless of any asymmetry in how
classes feel about being around each other. This result is due to the provider's ability to internalize
any asymmetry in the linear customer-mix eects by charging dierent prices. For example, the
male customers of a nightclub might end up paying a much higher price than the female customers;
in fact, the price dierential will be so large that the same number of customers from both classes
will eventually choose to join the system.
The next proposition characterizes the general structure of the NE, i.e., the structure of the
optimal solution to (P1).
Proposition 2. If customers from dierent classes are allowed to share the same space and the
service provider can price discriminate, the optimal solution to the revenue maximization problem
has the following properties:
(i) There exists threshold b(K) such that 1 = 0, 

2 > 0 if b  b(K), and 2  1 > 0 if b >
b(K).
(ii) If K minf(1+ a+ c(1))=2;2(1+ c(1))=3g, then 1+2 =K.
(iii) If K is suciently large, then 1+

2 <K.
(iv) If b is suciently positive so that 1 > 0 8K, or if b is suciently negative so that 1 = 0
8K, then there exists K(b) such that 1+2 =K if K K(b), and 1+2 <K if K >K(b).
Before we discuss the implications of Proposition 2 in detail, we should highlight an important
point. The reader might note that the structural properties as stated in the proposition depend on
b1 and b2 only through the term b= b1+ b2. This is in fact not surprising as one can show that the
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Figure 1 Structure of the optimal policy under price discrimination without capacity allocation when = 100.
optimization problem (P1) can equivalently be expressed in terms of b alone. As we will see later
in the paper, however, this is not the case when the service provider cannot price discriminate and
thus the optimal solution has a more complex relationship with the interaction terms b1 and b2.
Proposition 2 characterizes the basic structure of the NE and provides insights into the two key
decisions the service provider needs to make. First, she needs to decide whether to admit customers
from both classes (inclusive system) or to restrict access to the customers with higher willingness-
to-pay (exclusive system). Second, she needs to decide whether the existing capacity should be
fully utilized or intentionally kept underutilized at prot-maximizing prices. Figure 1 illustrates the
dierent system types that arise in equilibrium if classes are symmetric (a) or asymmetric (b). In
what follows, we rst discuss the most important insights in the case of symmetric classes and then
we highlight the dierences that arise if classes are asymmetric. When following this discussion,
the reader would likely nd it helpful to refer to the graphs in Figure 1. In symmetric classes,
Proposition 2-(i) states that although the system capacity is a factor in deciding whether or not
the system should be inclusive or exclusive, only the net appreciation term b is relevant. More
specically, if the net appreciation between classes is suciently negative, the provider is better
o leaving one class out of the system. Although it is possible that one class likes the other (e.g.,
b1 > 0), if the feelings of the other class are opposite and much more intense (i.e., b2 << b1), then
an exclusive system helps prevent customer-mix eects from hurting revenues. For example, some
female customers of gyms and health clubs are not willing to share the same workout space with
male customers. If this disutility of female customers is strong, the service provider might nd it
more protable to run an exclusive system. This might be the motivation behind Fitness USA's
decision to go women-only.
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Parts (ii), (iii), and (iv) of Proposition 2 characterize how the choice regarding the number of
customers in the system should be made to ll in the capacity. Not surprisingly, if the capacity
is suciently small, there are enough customers who would be willing to pay a high price and
the system will be fully utilized regardless of an exclusive or inclusive system. On the other hand,
if capacity is very large, running a full system is suboptimal as it would necessitate charging
unjustiably low prices or would be outright impossible.
Part (iv) of Proposition 2 strengthens these structural properties further. When customer-mix
eects are so powerful that a system is either always inclusive or always exclusive regardless of
its capacity, then progressively larger capacities can only imply transitions from full to not full
systems. However, if the customer-mix eects are relatively weak, which is possibly the most
common scenario in a leisure facility, then we have some interesting and unexpected changes in
the preference for exclusivity and crowding level (Figure 1(a)). We use a numerical example to
illustrate this. Consider a small absolute value of the net appreciation eect, b= 1:1, and = 100,
a= 0. We will consider three dierent capacity levels of K = 45;50;60. (See the dashed line and
squares on Figure 1(a) to follow the rest of the paragraph.) If K = 45, the system is in the regime
of part (ii) of Proposition 2, i.e., a full exclusive system is optimal and the corresponding revenue
is R(0;45) = 24:75. On the other hand, the highest revenue an inclusive system could yield is
R(22:5;22:5) = 22:5. In this case, the limited capacity does not allow the provider to adequately
counter the negative customer-mix eects by admitting more customers from both classes. Suppose
that capacity increases to K = 51. Now, the most protable system is still exclusive but not full,
with 50 customers and revenue R(0;50) = 25, whereas the highest revenue an inclusive system
could yield is R(25:5;25:5) = 23:97. In this case, again, capacity is not sucient to result in enough
revenue for an inclusive system to be optimal. Finally, suppose that capacity increases even further
to K = 60. The optimal system now is full and inclusive, with 30 customers from each class and
revenue R(30;30) = 25:5. On the other hand, the highest revenue an exclusive system could yield
remains at R(0;50) = 25. At this capacity level, the provider can admit enough customers from both
classes to make up for the revenue she loses due to negative customer-mix eects. It is the negative
customer interaction eects that hurt revenues of inclusive systems, thus making it dicult to make
a general statement about the eect of capacity changes based on intuition alone. In the absence
of such eects, admitting customers from both classes would raise the average price customers pay
compared to an exclusive system with the same number of customers.
In asymmetric classes, the asymmetry in the willingness to pay for service does not change
substantially the structure of the equilibrium (Figure 1(b)). However, there are two noteworthy
dierences. First, the net appreciation between classes needs to be higher for inclusivity to be the
optimal choice because the provider can simply nd more customers in class{2 than in class{1 to
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pay a good price for service. Second, when the two classes are strongly asymmetric, as in the case
of Figure 1(b), an increase in the system capacity can never result in the optimal crowding level
changing from \not full" to \full." This is in contrast to the symmetric and weakly asymmetric
cases (Figure 1(a)), where a capacity increase can switch the optimal policy from \exclusive, not
full" to \inclusive, full." This dierence is due to the fact that class-1 customers' low willingness-
to-pay combined with suciently strong negative customer eects between the two classes does
not justify admitting class-1 customers in the more asymmetric cases. Thus, the system remains
exclusive as capacity increases and operating a full system does not become a better alternative.
We conclude this section with a comparison of the prices that classes pay when they coexist. The
revenue achieved by the service provider depends on the overall asymmetry of the classes (b, a) that
determines the proportion of the customers that will join the facility (1, 2). The extra exibility
that she possesses, she uses it by charging prices that reect the classes' feelings; higher bi implies
higher pi. Equations (8) and (9) imply that p

2   p1 = a+ (1   2)=+ (b21   b12)=(1 + 2).
Wherefore, if classes are symmetric and the provider runs an inclusive system, the class that
likes (dislikes) the other the most (the least) pays a higher price for service and in particular,
p2 p1 = (b2  b1)=2. This might explain why \ladies" are oered discounts to compensate for their
weaker utility of having \gentlemen" around in in nightclubs or why some colleges oer reduced
tuition to students of high caliber.
With asymmetric classes (a> 0), the price comparison is not straightforward. In this case, 1 <

2
and class{2 customers might end up paying less than class{1 customers, although they can aord
a higher price for service. The reason is that if class{1 customers value the presence of class 2 much
more than class{2 customers value them in return (b1 >> b2), the former will end up paying more
than the latter although they are not as wealthy on average. This result partially explains why
famous and wealthy individuals enjoy a free ride at certain social events; the strong desire of less
wealthy and less famous people to be around them might give rise to this phenomenon.
4.2. Single price without capacity allocation
As discussed in Section 1, price discrimination is a sensitive issue and can be illegal, or not ethical,
when it is based on a demographic factor. Whether or not it is implemented depends on a com-
bination of factors including what the law says about the practice, whether the law is enforced,
customers' attitude, and the provider's ability to manage customer perceptions. When the manager
is constrained to charging a single price, she has to either charge the optimal unique price to both
classes or she may oer the service to only one of the two classes.
Using (8) and (9), the constraint p1 = p2 implies
[b1=(1+2)+ 1=]2 = [b2=(1+2)+ 1=]1+ a: (4)
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Because a 0, a NE in which the provider charges a single price and 12 > 0 is possible only if
b1 < 0 and b2 < a, or if b2 > K= and b1 >a K=. Hence, without proof, the following lemma.
Lemma 2. The service provider can charge a single price in a NE in which 1

2 > 0 only if
b1 < 0 and b2 < a, or if b2 > K= and b1 >a K=.
The necessary conditions of Lemma 2 essentially say that there is a limit to how dierently the
two customer classes can feel about each other and still allow a protable single{price policy with
both classes being admitted. Interestingly, if the dislike between customer classes is mutual, this is
not sucient for the provider to deny service to one of the classes. In that case, there are always
customers who are willing to pay the asking price and bear with the customers from the other class
due to the inherent heterogeneity within customer classes. The intensity of the customer feelings
determines the ratio of the two classes in the facility and as a result, when there is strong asymmetry
in the two classes' mutual appreciation, it is not protable to maintain an inclusive facility using a
single price. Although Lemma 2 identies conditions under which an inclusive system with single
price might be protable, the provider might be better o running an exclusive system (Figure 2).
To solve the optimization problem (P2), the service provider rst solves the following problem
(P20), which enforces the single{price constraint and ignores the possibility that the service can
be limited to only one class. Problem (P20) is essentially problem (P1) with the addition of the
single{price constraint (4).
max1;2 R(1; 2) = 1p1(1; 2)+2p2(2; 1)
s.t. 1+2 K
[b1=(1+2)+ 1=]2 = [b2=(1+2)+ 1=]1+ a
0 1 ;0 2 :
(P20)
The solution to (P2) is then obtained by comparing the optimal solution to (P20) with the optimal
solution under which the service is restricted to class{2 customers. (There is no need to consider
the case where service is restricted to class{1 customers because such a solution is guaranteed to
not lead to higher revenue. Restriction to either class leads to the same revenue only if a= 0.)
We rst establish some basic properties of the optimal solution (1; 

2) to problem (P2).
Lemma 3. (i) If a= 0 and b1  b2, then either 12 = 0 or 1  2. Similarly, if a= 0 and
b2  b1, then either 12 = 0 or 2  1
(ii) If a= 0, a feasible solution to (P2) at which 1 =  > 0, 2 = 0, is revenue{equivalent to a
feasible solution to (P2) at which 1 = 0, 2 = > 0.
According to Lemma 3, if classes are symmetric, the provider either admits only one customer
class, or she runs an inclusive system with more customers from the class that likes (dislikes) the
other more (less). Since the classes are not truly symmetric, when a= 0 but b1 6= b2, the single-price
constraint does not permit a customer mix with an equal number of customers from both classes.
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Figure 2 Structure of the optimal policy under single-price policy without capacity allocation when  = 100,
b2 = 0.
For example, if b1 > b2 and the provider charges a single price, there will be more class{1 than
class-2 customers who are willing to pay that price and the optimal customer mix will have more
customers from class{1.
The next proposition characterizes the overall structure of the NE in the case of single price,
i.e., the structure of the optimal solution to (P2). (We slightly abuse notation by using the same
symbols, b(K) and K(b), in both propositions, although they might correspond to dierent
values.)
Proposition 3. If customers from both classes are allowed to share the same space and the
service provider cannot price discriminate, the optimal solution has the following properties, where
we let b jb1  b2j.
(i) There exists a threshold b(K) such that 1 = 0 if b b(K), and 1 > 0 if b > b(K). Fur-
thermore, if a= 0 and there exists a net appreciation value ~b such that b1+ b2 =~b and 

1

2 > 0 if
~b= 0, then there exists threshold b(K)> 0 such that 1

2 > 0 if bb(K), and 12 = 0
if b >b(K).
(ii) If K minf(1+ a+ c(1))=2;(1+ c(1))g, then 1+2 =K.
(iii) If K is suciently large, then 1+

2 <K.
(iv) If b is suciently positive so that 1 > 0 8K, or if b is suciently negative so that 1 = 0
8K, then there exists K(b) such that 1+2 =K if K K(b), and 1+2 <K if K >K(b).
A quick read of Proposition 3 reveals that each of its statements corresponds to an analogous state-
ment in Proposition 2, which is also evident by comparing Figures 1 and 2. There is, however, one
Kostami, Kostamis and Ziya: Pricing and Capacity Allocation for Shared Services
16 Article submitted to Manufacturing & Service Operations Management; manuscript no. MSOM-14-165.R2
important dierence. The second part of Proposition 3-(i) states that, for a given net appreciation
term, unless the two individual terms b1 and b2 are suciently close to each other, service will
be restricted to one class. In other words, a single-price policy leads to an exclusive system when
this asymmetry is suciently large unlike in the price discrimination case where the asymmetric
customer-mix eects are absorbed by the dierential pricing (Figures 1 and 2). The revenue is
tightly constrained by the single{price condition. As we explained in the discussion of Lemma 2,
this condition critically depends on how dierent terms b1 and b2 are from each other. Thus, when
the provider charges a single price, not only the net appreciation term, but also the individual
terms b1 and b2 are important. In other words, the customer mix eects on revenue, which are
symmetric across classes under price discrimination, become asymmetric under the single{price
clause. This result practically implies that when regulators attempt to achieve \price fairness"
by disallowing price discrimination, they might inadvertently be forcing the service provider to
exclude an entire class of customers from service if that is practically feasible. Although there is
no evidence to conclude that this is the reason why gyms like Fitness USA, convert some of their
locations to women-only establishments, they are very likely to be aected by similar underlying
dynamics. By restricting access to females, these gyms not only become more appealing to women
and increase their willingness to pay for the experience, but also bypass any possible restriction
(legal or otherwise) to charge the same price to both men and women. It is also interesting that, due
to this phenomenon, the optimal price may have a non-monotonic relationship with the capacity.
Specically, one might expect that the optimal price would decrease with an increase in system
capacity but as it turns out, a larger capacity might mean the optimality of an inclusive system
with a higher price.
4.3. Price discrimination with capacity allocation
Capacity allocation with or without price discrimination is a prevalent practice. For example, theme
cruises typically occupy part of a cruise ship while the rest is lled with passengers on a regular
tour. Similarly, some health clubs, or public swimming pools allocate their capacity to dierent
customer classes through space separation or time allocation.
If the service provider can allocate capacity, she needs to decide the capacity to allocate to each
class as well as the optimal number of customers to admit. In the subsequent analysis, (1  x)K
denotes the fraction of capacity allocated to class{1 customers and xK denotes the fraction of
capacity allocated to class{2 customers. The equilibrium prices are modied as follows
p1(1) = 1 1=+ c (1=((1 x)K)) ; (5)
p2(2) = 1 2=+ a+ c (2=(xK)) ; (6)
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where the customer mix eects disappear since the two classes do not coexist. As previously, we
study rst the price discrimination policy (CA-DP) and in x4.4, we focus on the single{price policy
(CA-SP).
Given the choices of capacity allocation and price discrimination, the service provider is faced
with the following revenue maximization problem:
max1;2;x R(1; 2; x) = 1p1(1)+2p2(2)
s.t. 0 1  (1 x)K; 0 2  xK
0 x 1:
(P3)
We rst establish the uniqueness of the optimal solution to problem (P3), as well as some important
properties of x, the optimal fraction of capacity allocated to class 2.
Lemma 4. (i) There exists a unique optimal solution to (P3).
(ii) If 1

2 > 0, crowding levels are the same in both capacity segments, i.e.,
1
(1 x)K =
2
xK .
(iii) The optimal allocation fraction for class 2, x, equals 2=(

1+

2).
(iv) If a= 0, x = 1=2. In addition, x is increasing in a.
Lemma 4 is a key result for the remainder of our analysis. The fact that the classes are identical in
their sensitivity towards crowding and that the crowding disutility function c is (strictly) concave
explains the identical crowding levels in both segments. Furthermore, they are inextricably linked
to each other because the two capacity segments share the same total capacity. Hence, there is a
unique capacity allocation that results in equal crowding levels in the two segments. In the absence
of customer mix eects, the capacity will be equally split when the two classes are symmetric but
in the asymmetric case, more capacity will be allocated to the class that values the service more.
4.4. Single price with capacity allocation
In this section, we describe the optimization problem of the service provider when capacity alloca-
tion is an option but prices need to be the same for both classes. First, note that the single{price
constraint is relevant only when 0<x< 1. In that case, enforcing p1 = p2 in (5) and (6) yields,
2=  c (2=(xK)) = 1=  c (1=((1 x)K))+ a: (7)
As in the case of capacity sharing with single{price restriction, the single{price constraint dis-
appears when x= 0 or x= 1, and the problem is solved in two stages. First, the service provider
solves the following optimization problem:
max1;2;x R(1; 2; x) = 1p1(1)+2p2(2)
s.t. 0 1  (1 x)K; 0 2  xK
0<x< 1
2=  c(2=(xK)) = 1=  c(1=[(1 x)K])+ a:
(P40)
The solution to optimization problem (P4) is then obtained by comparing the optimal solution to
(P40) with the optimal solution under which the whole capacity is reserved for class{2 customers.
In section 5, we use the optimization problem (P4) to prove a number of results on how the policies
compare with each other with respect to their optimal revenues.
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5. Policy Comparison
In this section, we focus on the most important aspect of the service provider's decision; the policy
to adopt depending on the attributes of the customer base. We compare the revenues under the
dierent scenarios and provide valuable analytical results for the design of such a service system.
We start with the case where the manager has the exibility to charge dierent prices to the two
customer classes and we establish a useful link between the optimal solution to problem (P1) and
the optimal solution to problem (P3) in the next corollary.
Corollary 1. If the service provider can price discriminate and b= 0, the optimal revenue and
customer mix are the same with or without capacity allocation.
Corollary 1 essentially says that if the net appreciation term is zero, the ability to allocate capacity
does not change anything: the provider makes the same revenue with or without capacity allocation,
and the resulting customer mix is the same. The linear customer mix eects allow the provider to
absorb any signicant asymmetry in how the two classes feel about each other (e.g., b1 >> 0 and
b2 << 0) through price discrimination. If these asymmetric customer-mix eects are roughly the
same in absolute value, then there is not much to gain from separation. Corollary 1 might leave
one with the impression that prices with and without capacity allocation are the same. That is not
true in general. Unless b1 = b2 = 0, a simple pairwise comparison of equations (8){(9) and (5){(6)
reveals that the provider charges dierent prices when she allocates capacity and when she does
not. For example, if b1 > 0; b2 < 0; b1+b2 = 0, class{1 customers pay a lower price when the provider
allocates capacity than when she does not because they lose the benet of interacting with class{2
customers that they like. The opposite is true for class{2 customers. This price dierence leaves the
net customer utility unaected but points to an important implication of an operational decision:
depending on whether or not the service provider uses capacity allocation, customers from both
classes can end up enjoying dierent service values and paying signicantly dierent prices without
aecting the service provider's revenue. We illustrate this in detail in Table 1 later.
In general, when b 6= 0, the service provider has to choose between capacity allocation and sharing.
The next theorem provides sucient conditions for the optimality of each strategy.2
Theorem 1. If the service provider can allocate capacity and can price discriminate, the capacity
allocation decision is as follows:
(i) If b 0, it is optimal to allocate capacity.
(ii) If b 0, it is optimal to not allocate capacity.
2 In the statements of Theorems 1-2, note that the optimality of not allocating capacity does not necessarily imply
an inclusive system; it implies that the provider cannot achieve strictly higher revenue by allocating capacity.
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Theorem 1 conrms the reality of many service systems, in which providers allocate capacity to
mitigate negative interactions between dierent customer classes. An interesting observation in
Theorem 1 is that any asymmetry in the classes' willingness to pay for service (i.e., the value of
a) does not aect the sucient conditions. Although one might expect larger asymmetry to favor
capacity allocation, the capacity allocation only aims to prevent customer interactions that hurt
the overall customer experience and has nothing to do with customers' willingness to pay. The
provider takes into account any asymmetry in the willingness to pay for service by letting more
class{2 customers in the optimal customer mix through pricing or by allocating more capacity
to them (when classes use dierent capacity segments). The exibility of charging dierent prices
allows the service provider to deal with the asymmetry in the willingness-to-pay through pricing.
As a result, parameter a plays no role in the service provider's decision on capacity allocation. This
is not the case when both classes have to be charged the same price and as a result the asymmetry
parameter a becomes a signicant factor, as the following theorem indicates.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the service provider cannot discriminate but has the exibility to
allocate capacity for the exclusive use of each class. Then, there exists b(a) such that
(i) If b1  0, b2  0, it is optimal to allocate capacity.
(ii) If b2 > 0> b1, then
(a) If b1  a K=, it is optimal to allocate capacity.
(b) If b1 >a K= and b b(a) (with b(a) 0), it is optimal to allocate capacity.
(c) If b1 >a K= and b b(a) (with b(a) 0), it is optimal to not allocate capacity.
(iii) If b1 > 0> b2, then
(a) If b2  K=, or b1  a K= and b2 > K=, it is optimal to allocate capacity.
(b) If b1 >a K=, b2 > K= and 1 = 0 in (P2), it is optimal to allocate capacity.
(c) If b= 0, a
2
 b1 >a  K , b2  a2 and 1 > 0 in (P2), it is optimal to not allocate capacity.
(iv) If b1  0, b2  0, it is optimal to not allocate capacity.
Furthermore, if b = b(a), allocating and not allocating capacity yield the same revenue to the
provider.
As Theorem 2 shows, the provider's decision regarding capacity allocation is more complicated if
she cannot price discriminate. There are two important observations we can make by comparing
Theorems 1 and 2. First, a single{price policy leads to capacity allocation in more cases than
price discrimination does. Second, when deciding on the capacity allocation, the ability to price
discriminate allows the service provider to determine the optimal choice with less information on
customer-mix eects. Nonetheless, notice that parts (i) and (iv) of Theorem 2 are analogous to
parts (i) and (ii) of Theorem 1, respectively. If classes dislike each other, it is better to separate
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S1: b1 = b2 = 0 S2: b1 = 0:3; b2 = 0:3 S3: b1 = 0:6; b2 = 0:6
Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity Capacity
Allocation Sharing Allocation Sharing Allocation Sharing
p1 = 0:73 p

1 = 0:73 p

1 = 0:92 p

1 = 0:73 p

1 = 1:12
Double p2 = 0:98 p

2 = 0:98 p

2 = 0:87 p

2 = 0:98 p

2 = 0:77
Price
R(27:5;52:5) = 71:125
Single p = 0:85 p = 0:85 p = 0:89 p = 0:85 p = 0:81
Price
R(15;65) = 68 R(15;65) = 68 R(30;50) = 71 R(15;65) = 68 R(45;35) = 65
Table 1 Optimal Revenue (evaluated at the optimal arrival rates) and Prices under Capacity Allocation and
Capacity Sharing under the price discrimination and the single price policy for three dierent scenarios (S1-S3)
with zero net appreciation when = 100;K = 80; a= 0:5
them. If there is mutual appeal, it is more protable to refrain from capacity allocation. Thus, if
class feelings are mutual, neither the pricing policy nor the asymmetry in the willingness to pay
for service have an impact on the capacity allocation decision.
The provider's choice is less straightforward if class perceptions go in opposite directions. When
a= 0, the two cases are completely symmetric and parts (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 2 are identical.
If b2 > 0> b1, the sucient conditions of Theorem 2-(ii) conrm that the single{price constraint
results in capacity allocation in more cases than price discrimination does. If b1 > 0 > b2, and
classes' feelings toward each other are so dierent that the provider's best choice without capacity
allocation is an exclusive system as outlined in Lemma 2, then she is better o allocating capacity
when there is such a exibility (parts (iii)-a and (iii)-b of Theorem 2). What is more interesting is
the case when conditions are such that the provider's optimal choice is to run an inclusive system,
i.e., not allocating capacity, and price discrimination is not an option (Theorem 2(ii)-c,(iii)-c and
(iv)) and we investigate that in more detail in Section 6 using some numerical examples.
6. Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we rst expand on our discussion of Theorems 1 and 2 via a numerical study. Then,
we investigate the importance of the customer mix eects in service systems and the sensitivity of
the dierent policies to various parameters. Finally, we study the validity of our results when we
relax the same class size assumption for the two customer classes.
Comparison of the dierent policies for asymmetric classes
We use three dierent sets of parameters with zero net appreciation (b= 0) to gain insights into
how the provider's revenues change depending on the capacity allocation decision and the pricing
policy followed. We set = 100, K = 80 and a= 0:5. The optimal solutions are provided in Table
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1. As discussed earlier, when the manager can price discriminate, she will attract the same mix
of customers, independently of the capacity decision, by charging dierent prices, and yield the
same revenue (1 = 27:5; 

2 = 52:5 and R(27:5;52:5) = 71:125). However, in the single price policy,
mixing the customers or allocating capacity yields the same revenue only when b1 = b2 = 0 (S1). The
revenues might be the same, but prices can be dierent for the two capacity allocation decisions.
Suppose now that b1 = 0:3 and b2 = 0:3 so that b1 > 0> b2. These changes do not aect the revenue
under capacity allocation (because dierent classes do not interact), but they change the revenue of
an inclusive system. Specically, the new solution yields higher revenue than before, R(30;50) = 71,
and thus operating an inclusive system with both classes sharing the whole capacity is strictly
better than allocating capacity for the exclusive use of each class. There are two interesting points to
highlight using this example. First, although asymmetry in customer-mix eects hurts revenue when
classes are ex ante symmetric (a= 0), that may not be the case when classes are ex ante asymmetric
(a > 0). Second, when customers are no longer indierent about the presence of customers from
the other class, it is strictly preferable to have a system where both classes share the facility. As
we explain below, both are consequences of the same price constraint.
If classes are ex ante asymmetric and b1 = b2 = 0, class 2 would pay more for service than class
1 if the provider could price discriminate. However, the single{price constraint requires that class{
1({2) customers pay more(less) than what they would have had under price discrimination, thereby
resulting in inecient pricing. Suppose now that b= 0 but b1 > 0> b2. In that case, all else being
equal, class{1 customers are willing to pay more than class{2 customers to be around customers
of the other type; in other words, the eect of the asymmetry in class feelings is in line with the
single{price mandate. What does this mean for the revenue of an inclusive system? Compared to
the case where each class is indierent about the other's presence (b1 = b2 = 0), it is better to
have a small asymmetry in perceptions, with class{1 customers having slight preference for having
class{2 customers around while class{2 customers having slight preference for not having class{
1 customers around. As a result, in S2, price discrimination has little benet. However, if this
asymmetry in perceptions is strong (S3), it becomes critical in implementing a single{price policy
and will force the provider to separate the classes or admit one class only. Also, if the asymmetry
is in the opposite direction, with class{2 customers enjoying the presence of class{1 customers,
class feelings are no longer in line with the single{price mandate and an inclusive system is not the
preferred choice of the service provider.
Part (iii)-c of Theorem 2 states some particularly interesting conditions that guarantee the
optimality of capacity sharing; as long as the net appreciation term is zero, a small asymmetry in
classes' feelings about each other increases the revenue of a system when classes are not separated,
and this can also be observed in Table 1 (S2). Because it is strictly better to not separate classes if b1
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and b2 are suciently small in absolute value and b= 0, the provider would also be better o doing
so for small yet negative values of b. This means that in some cases, a single{price policy makes
capacity allocation less likely than price discrimination does. This might appear to be contradicting
one of the insights we have obtained so far, i.e., that single{price policies lead to more exclusivity.
It is true that if the provider's choice is only between an inclusive but sharing system and an
exclusive system with only one class admitted, then a single{price mandate always leads to more
exclusivity because that mandate disappears in an exclusive system. However, exclusivity as a
result of separating the two customer classes by capacity allocation does not make the single{price
mandate disappear. In that case, there might be some benet from keeping ex ante asymmetric
classes together and mitigating the pricing ineciency that a single price causes, even if these
classes feel dierently about being around each other and their net appreciation is negative.
Value of capturing customer mix eects
To further highlight the value of capturing the customer mix eects, we compare the optimal
revenues with the revenues we would have achieved had we ignored the parameters b1 and b2
by assuming b1 = b2 = 0. We will follow the examples in Table 1 to make this comparison and
use S1 as a benchmark. In S2, when customers can share the service facility and there is price
discrimination (CS-DP), the revenue would be R0(41:5;36:5) = 67:75 instead of R(27:5;52:5) =
71:125. When both classes pay the same price (CS-SP), that is p= 0:85, then the revenue would be
R0(32:7;47:3) = 68 instead of the optimal R(30;50) = 71. Similarly, for the set of parameters in S3,
under price discrimination (CS-DP), the revenue would drop to R0(0;52:5) = 51:19 compared to
R(27:5;52:5) = 71:125. In this case, ignoring the customer mix eects forces the system to become
an exclusive one due to the high price charged to class{1 customers. For the single price policy
(CS-SP), the revenue would be R0(40:4;31:4) = 60:95 instead of R(45;35) = 65. These examples
are indicative of how high the losses can be and also conrm the fact that a suboptimal capacity
allocation strategy might be followed. Taking into consideration that these losses become higher
and more discernible when b 6= 0 further supports the operational importance of an appropriate
capacity allocation decision and pricing strategy.
Sensitivity analysis with respect to system capacity and the strength of customer
asymmetry and interaction eects
We have also conducted numerical studies to understand the impact of the parameters a; b; K on
the revenue under dierent policies. Some of the interesting examples are shown in Figure 3. When
the net appreciation is negative, capacity allocation is superior to mixing the customers and with
higher a, chances are higher to operate an exclusive system at least under low capacity (a small
facility can be lled up with high-paying customers). As b increases, mixing the customers becomes
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Figure 3 Comparison of the revenues for the four dierent policies: capacity allocation (CA) with single price
(SP) or price discrimination (DP) and shared capacity (CS) as the capacity increases for dierent values
of the net appreciation and a when = 100.
more protable with b= 0 making the policies equivalent and b > 0 making capacity sharing the
preferred choice. Not surprisingly, price discrimination is at least as good as single price policy and
thus, the service provider has the incentive to price discriminate, even when illegal, and incur a
penalty up to a certain level. Using an example from the gure with a= 1 (when a= 0, the pricing
strategy does not matter) and b= 0:5, K = 150, the manager can achieve 25% more revenue if
she charges the two classes dierently (Figure 3(c)). Finally, as one can observe from Figure 3,
investing in capacity can benet the facility but only up to a certain point.
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2 = 100
1
CA-SP CA-DP CS-DP CS-SP
50 96 99 96 99
100 96 100.5 96 100.5
150 96 101.4 96 101.4
1 = 100
2
CA-SP CA-DP CS-DP CS-SP
50 50 72.3 50 72.33
100 96 100.5 96 100.5
150 117.3 117.4 117.3 117.4
Table 2 Optimal Revenue for the dierent policies as the class sizes change (K = 80, b= 0, a= 1).
Dierent class sizes
Heretofore, we focused on leisure facilities that attract two customer classes of the same size but
this might not be always the case. One interesting fact we observed from our numerical experiments
is that for high values of a the changes in the size of class 2 have a higher impact on the revenue
than changes in 1. This is due to the asymmetry of the two classes in terms of their willingness
to pay for the service (Table 2). Moreover, we observed that under price discrimination, as the size
of one class increases, while the other is constant or decreasing, the system tends to operate in an
exclusive manner more often than before (b(K) is higher). But if a is higher and class 2 is small,
i.e. the high value customers are few, then the facility is better o admitting a mix of customers.
In other words, the manager has to exhaust her options of attracting the high value customers
but might be limited by their class size. It is also important to note that our numerical analysis
suggests that the results of Theorem 1 continue to hold. Not surprisingly, however, the conditions
of Theorem 2 have to be modied to account for dierent class sizes.
7. Conclusions
This paper deals with a particular type of service setting, where service takes an extended period
of time and is shared by others so that what happens during service or more specically who else is
there during service is a very important determinant of the customers' utility. Despite the prevalence
of such services in practice, these features are sometimes ignored by the service managers and they
have received limited attention in the operations literature. One of the important contributions of
this paper is the development of a stylized framework that can be helpful in building new models to
investigate various research questions (e.g., eects of competition) regarding shared service systems.
We developed a framework to provide insights into the use of pricing and capacity allocation
as leverages to control the customer mix and crowding. Some of our ndings conform to what
we observe in practice and our intuition (for example, the use of discounts if there is asymmetry
between how dierent classes feel about each other), whereas others are either counter{intuitive or
help us gain a deeper understanding of some of the issues for which intuition is nonexistent. For
example, we nd that if the service provider is restricted to charge the same price to two highly
asymmetric (either with respect to mutual appreciation or willingness-to-pay) customer classes,
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the service provider can be protable only by oering the service to only one class. Interestingly,
however, when there is mutual dislike between the two classes, the facility can protably serve
both classes. In short, when faced with suciently asymmetric customer classes, the best action
for the service provider is to restrict access to a particular class of customers or to allocate dierent
portions of its capacity for the exclusive use of dierent customer classes. Thus, strong asymmetry
requires some sort of discrimination or capacity allocation for the survival of the rm.
For a service provider who can use price discrimination, the choice between allocating capacity
for the exclusive use of dierent classes and making the whole capacity available to all its customers
depends purely on the customer mix eects, not on crowding eects, capacity, or the degree of
asymmetry in the two customer classes' willingness to pay. Specically, capacity allocation is desir-
able if the net appreciation is negative. If price discrimination is not an option, capacity allocation
could be desirable even if the net appreciation is positive. Thus, in many cases, disallowing price
discrimination makes it more likely for rms to serve the dierent customer classes separately. It
is, however, possible that restriction to a single-price policy might lead the provider to switch to
an inclusive system with the whole capacity available to both classes. This can only happen if the
class with the lower willingness to pay for service likes the other class because only in this case,
inclusivity helps reduce the gap between the willingness-to-pay of the two classes.
Our results highlight the importance of having a deeper understanding of customer-mix eects
on the utilities of dierent customer classes, because they are highly relevant in choosing the pricing
and capacity allocation policies to be employed. Many articles in the marketing literature have
established the presence and importance of these eects, but we are not aware of any work that
has aimed to quantify them. To take advantage of the insights, a rough estimate of the parameters
might sometimes be sucient to determine the right strategy. However, some quantication of
the customer mix eects, i.e. the sign of b and/or which eect is dominant could be critical in
maximizing prot. Thus, one avenue for future research is to develop a framework that can be
utilized in measuring customer-mix eects empirically in dierent service settings. Capturing the
valuation for the service is also challenging, yet necessary, to determine the optimal pricing policy. In
this direction, economists and marketing researchers have used surveys, experiments, transactions
data to infer the willingness to pay of the customers (Wertenbroch and Skiera 2002). Most of these
methods can be put into use when estimating customer mix eects.
In some of the service settings we have discussed, the service establishment can gain some pooling
benet if it allows the two customer classes to share the facility (or possibly incur a cost to separate
the physical space). This is something we ignored in our formulation. If this benet were to be
considered, our results would change accordingly; the threshold on the customer mix eects would
be negative for the capacity allocation to be optimal accounting for the pooling loss. As expected,
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the new threshold would depend on the actual cost savings from pooling resources; the higher the
saving, the lower the threshold would be. In other words, when the savings from pooling are higher,
the classes' appreciation of each other would need to be stronger in the negative direction for
capacity allocation to be optimal. In some cases, changing the capacity allocation strategy might
be costly as it may require rebuilding the whole facility. In that case, the problem is more complex
and its analysis would require a formulation that is dierent from the one we considered in this
paper. If rebuilding the facility is an option to the provider, i.e. she is not restricted by the actual
size of the facility, then at the beginning of the time horizon, she has to take into consideration
several factors including the size of the investment, the competition, the market targeted etc., and
investigate how much prot the rm would make at dierent levels of capacity investment in order
to make an optimal decision.
Our model assumed that there is no demand uncertainty and customers make their joining deci-
sion simultaneously knowing the behavior of all the other customers. However, it would also be
interesting to consider a formulation with stochastic demand and sequential arrivals, so that the
manager can dynamically adjust the admission price to control demand. Another interesting direc-
tion would be to study multiple competing facilities, each oering dierent capacity arrangements
to their customers.
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